Abstract: This paper examines whether financial development boosts the growth of small firms more than large firms and hence provides information on the mechanisms through which financial development fosters aggregate economic growth. We define an industry's technological firm size as the firm size implied by industry specific production technologies, including capital intensities and scale economies. Using cross-industry, cross-country data, the results indicate that financial development exerts a disproportionately large effect on the growth of industries that are technologically more dependent on small firms. This suggests that financial development accelerates economic growth by removing growth constraints on small firms and also implies that financial development has sectoral as well as aggregate growth ramifications.
I. Introduction
Although a large literature suggests that financial development fosters economic growth, considerably less research examines the cross-firm, cross-industry distributional effects of financial development. 1 Some theories imply that financial development boosts economic growth by disproportionately fostering small firm growth. If smaller, less wealthy firms face tighter credit constraints than large firms face due to greater informational barriers or high fixed costs associated with accessing financial systems, then financial development that ameliorates market frictions will exert an especially positive impact on smaller firms (Banerjee and Newman, 1993; Galor and Zeira, 1993; Aghion and Bolton, 1997) . 2 In contrast, other research suggests that most small, less wealthy firms, especially in poor countries, cannot afford financial services, so that financial development disproportionately facilitates the growth of large firms (Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990) .
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This paper assesses whether financial development boosts the growth of small firms more than large firms and hence sheds empirical light on (1) debates concerning the distributional implications of financial development, (2) one mechanism through which financial development may affect aggregate economic growth, and (3) a large policy-oriented literature that stresses the importance of small firm growth for economic development. In terms of public policies, the World Bank (1994 Bank ( , 2002 Bank ( , 2004 argues that small firms foster competition, innovation, and employment to a greater degree than large firms and has devoted more than $10 billion in the last five years toward 1 See Levine (2005) for a review of the literature on financial development and growth. Specifically, cross-country studies (King and Levine 1993; Beck, Levine, and Loayza 2000; Levine, Loayza, and Beck 2000) , firm-level studies (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 1998), and industry-level studies (Rajan and Zingales 1998; Wurgler 2000) find that the level of financial development is positively related to growth and this relationship is not due only to simultaneity bias. Aghion, P., Howitt, and D. Mayer-Foulkes (2005) find that financial development accelerates the speed of convergence toward a steady state, but does not influence steady-state growth. 2 In these models, financial development that lowers information or transaction costs disproportionately benefits less wealthy entrepreneurs. In terms of U.S. banks, Jayaratne and Strahan (1998) find that efficiency improvements reduced fixed costs included in loan prices, helping small firms. 3 Schmukler (2003, 2004) provide evidence that international financial liberalization has primarily benefited large, rich firms. Also, local banking monopolies may foster close relationships between banks and small firms and promoting small enterprises. Rather than examining whether small firms per se accelerate growth, we examine whether financial under-development exerts a particularly onerous impact on small firms. Furthermore, while considerable research suggests that finance is closely associated with economic growth, dissecting the mechanisms connecting finance and growth provides information on whether -and if so how --financial development causes growth, or whether financial development is simply associated with fast growing economies. Toward this end, this paper examines whether financial development accelerates growth by boosting small firm growth.
Finally, as stressed above, financial development may have distributional implications. This paper examines whether financial development is particularly good for large firms or small firms, or whether financial development has a balanced impact on firms of different sizes.
We examine whether industries that are composed of small firms for technological reasons grow faster in economies with well-developed financial systems. As formulated by Coase (1937) , firms should optimally internalize some activities, but size enhances complexity and coordination costs. Thus, an industry's optimal firm size depends on that industry's particular production technologies, including capital intensities and scale economies (Kumar, Rajan, and Zingales, 2001 ).
Given estimates of each industry's technological firm size, we use a sample of 44 countries and 36 industries in the manufacturing sector to examine the growth rates of different industries across countries with different levels of financial development. If "small-firm industries" -industries naturally composed of small firms for technological reasons -grow faster than "large-firm industries" in economies with more developed financial systems, then this suggests that (i) financial development boosts the growth of small-firm industries more than large-firm industries and (ii) one mechanism through which financial development accelerates growth is by fostering the growth of thereby increase credit availability to small firms Rajan, 1994, 1995) . If financial development intensifies competition and breaks these monopolies, it may also hurt small firms.
small firms. Instead, if financial development disproportionately boosts the growth of large-firm industries, then this implies quite different distributional effects. Finally, financial development may foster balanced growth, and therefore we would not find cross-industry distributional effects.
More specifically, we extend the Rajan and Zingales (1998, henceforth RZ) methodology to examine whether financial development enhances economic growth by easing constraints on industries that are technologically more dependent on small firms. RZ find that industries that are technologically more dependent on external finance grow disproportionately faster in countries with developed financial systems. They measure an industry's need for external finance (the difference between investment and cash from operations) using data on large, public corporations in the U.S.
Assuming that financial markets are relatively frictionless in the U.S., RZ identify each industry's "technological" demand for external finance, i.e., the demand for external finance in a frictionless financial system. They further assume that this technological demand for external finance is the same across countries. Instead of only considering each industry's technological dependence on external finance, we also examine each industry's technological firm size. We measure an industry's "technological" composition of small firms relative to large firms as the share of employment in firms with less than 20 employees in the U.S. Assuming that financial markets are relatively frictionless in the U.S., we therefore identify each industry's "technological" firm size in a relatively frictionless financial system. While conducting a large of number of sensitivity checks regarding the validity of this measure of technological firm size, we test whether industries that are technologically more dependent on small firms grow faster in countries with more developed financial systems.
The results indicate that small-firm industries grow disproportionately faster in economies with well-developed financial systems, which has two key implications. First, the findings indicate that financial development has cross-industry distributional ramifications: Financial development exerts a particularly positive growth effect on industries that are technologically more dependent on small firms. Second, the analyses advertise one mechanism through which finance influences aggregate economic growth: Financial development removes growth constraints on small-firm industries. Our analyses suggest that large-firm industries are not the same as industries that rely heavily on external finance. We control for cross-industry differences in external dependence, and confirm the RZ finding that financial development disproportionately boosts the growth rate of industries that are more dependent on external finance. Even when controlling for cross-industry differences in external dependence, however, we find that financial development disproportionately accelerates the growth of industries that for technological reasons are composed of small firms.
These results are robust to an array of sensitivity checks. Besides confirming that the results hold over different estimation periods, we assess the sensitivity of our findings to using different financial development indicators and alternative measures of small-firm share for each industry.
Furthermore, we were concerned that small-firm share might proxy for other industry characteristics that interact with country-level traits to explain industry growth. For instance, Claessens and Laeven (2003) find that industries characterized by high levels of intangible assets grow faster in countries with strong private property rights protection. If small firms have higher levels of intangible assets and strong property rights underlie financial development (Levine, 1999) , then our results on firm size may be spurious. We confirm our results, however, when controlling for the interaction of industrial reliance on intangible assets and national property rights protection.
Similarly, Fisman and Love (2003b) argue that financial development is particularly important for industries with substantial growth opportunities. If in our sample, small-firm industries are also those industries with above average growth opportunities, we may be capturing cross-industry differences in growth opportunities, not cross-industry differences in firm size. Again, however, when controlling for the interaction of financial development and each industry's growth rate in the United States, we continue to find that financial development exerts a particularly large impact on the growth of industries that are naturally composed of small firms. Finally, we were concerned that market size, human capital skills, and the level of economic development could influence industry size, invalidate the use of the U.S. as the benchmark country, and lead to inappropriate inferences.
Nevertheless, even when controlling for these country-specific traits, we continue to find that financial development exerts a particularly pronounced growth-effect on small-firm industries.
Moreover, we confirm this paper's findings using the United Kingdom as the benchmark country and when employing alternative definitions of industrial firm size.
There are limitations to our analyses. Some theories predict that financial development lowers information and transaction costs in ways that are particularly beneficial to small firms. We find evidence consistent with these theories. We do not, however, examine the links in the chain from financial development, to particular information and transaction costs, and on to small firm growth. This is similar to RZ. They find evidence consistent with theories stressing that financial development reduces the cost of external finance. They do not, however, measure the cost of external finance directly. Thus, although this paper's findings indicate that financial development boosts economic growth by fostering the growth of industries that are naturally composed of small firms, further research needs to link these findings to specific information and transactions costs.
Along similar lines, financial market imperfections could impede the growth of small-firm industries by causing firm size to deviate from its optimum or by hindering the flow of capital and other financial services to small firms. We do not explicitly distinguish among these possibilities.
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2003) , however, find no evidence that financial under-development distorts firm size. Given this finding, our results imply that financial underdevelopment disproportionately hinders the flow of growth-enhancing financial services to small firms.
Our paper relates closely to two recent papers that examine the importance of financial development for small firms. Using evidence across different regions in Italy, Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004) find that small firms enjoy more growth benefits than large firms from regional financial development. 4 Rather than focusing on inter-regional differences in Italy, we undertake a cross-country, country-industry investigation. Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2005) use firm-level survey data to assess the relationship between the financing obstacles that firms report they face and firm growth. They find that the negative impact of reported obstacles on firm growth is stronger for small firms than large firms and stronger in countries with under-developed financial systems. Their study has the advantage of using cross-country, firm-level data, but it has the disadvantage of relying on survey responses regarding the obstacles that firms encounter. In contrast, we use a different methodology that assesses whether industries that are naturally composed of small firms grow faster in countries with better-developed financial systems. Our research provides complimentary information on whether financial development fosters aggregate growth by disproportionately facilitating the growth of small firms.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II explains the data, while Section III describes the methodology. Section IV presents the main results and sensitivity tests.
Section V concludes. 4 In terms of new firm formation, Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004) also find that new firm creation is higher in Italian regions that are more financial development. Similarly, Black and Strahan (2002) show that more competitive banking markets are associated with higher levels of new incorporations in the United States.
II. Data
To assess whether financial development boosts the growth of industries that for 
II.2. Measure of Small Firm Share
Since our goal is to assess whether industries that are naturally composed of small firms grow faster, or slower, than large-firm industries in countries with greater financial development, we need to measure each industry's "natural" or technological firm size. Differences in productive technologies, capital intensities, and scale economies influence an industry's technological firm size (Coase, 1937, and Kumar, Rajan, and Zingales, 2001 Evans and Jovanovic (1989) argue that small firms in the United States are more liquidity constrained than large firms.
Our empirical methods, however, do not require that the U.S. financial system is perfect.
Rather, we require that financial market imperfections in the United States do not distort the ranking of industries in terms of the technological share of small firms within each industry. Since the United States has one the most developed financial systems in the world by many measures (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2001) , it represents a natural benchmark for providing a ranking of each industry's technological firm size.
As noted, the perfect benchmark country has relatively frictionless markets and policies distorting firm size beyond the financial sector. For instance, differences in human capital, market size, contract enforcement, and overall institutional development may influence industrial firm size beyond technological factors, such as scale economies, capital intensities, and industry-specific production processes shaping long-run average cost curves (You, 1995, and Kumar, Rajan, and Zingales, 2001 ). Thus, the ideal benchmark economy not only has relatively frictionless financial markets; it has relatively frictionless markets in general.
Again, the United States is a reasonable benchmark to derive each industry's technological Small Firm Share. The United States has the full spectrum of human capital skills and indeed attracts both high and low human capital workers from the rest of the world (Easterly and Levine, 2001) . Furthermore, comparative studies of U.S. and European labor markets suggest that the United States has many fewer policy distortions. Moreover, the U.S. internal market is huge andgiven its size -it is comparatively open to international trade. Furthermore, many studies point to the United States as having a superior contracting environment and well-developed institutions (La Porta et al, 1999) . Moreover, the United States does not need to have perfect labor markets, contracting systems, or institutions to act as a reasonable benchmark. To represent a good benchmark for Small Firm Share, we simply require that policy distortions and market imperfections in the United States do not distort the ranking of industries in terms of the technological share of small firms within each industry.
Furthermore, we present a battery of sensitivity analyses that assess the validity of using the United States as the benchmark country. We use different measures of Small Firm Share and also use a different benchmark country. Furthermore, since omitting country-specific factors that interact with industry characteristics and explain industry growth could bias the results, we control for an array of country traits. As we describe below, however, the results are robust to a variety of sensitivity checks.
II.3. Indicators of financial development
Ideally, one would like indicators of the degree to which the financial system ameliorates information and transactions frictions and facilitates the mobilization and efficient allocation of capital. Specifically, we would like indicators that capture the effectiveness with which financial systems research firms and identify profitable projects, exert corporate control, facilitate risk management, mobilize savings, and ease transactions. Unfortunately, no such measures are available across countries. Consequently, we rely on an assortment of traditional measures of financial development that existing work shows are robustly related to economic growth.
Private Credit i equals the value of credits by financial intermediaries to the private sector divided by GDP for country i. It captures the amount of credit channeled through financial intermediaries to the private sector. Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000) show that Private Credit is a good predictor or economic growth and also use instrumental variables in stressing that the strong, positive association between Private Credit and economic growth is not due to reverse causality. In our baseline regression, we measure Private Credit in the initial year of our estimation period, 1980
(or the first year in which data are available). We use the initial year to control for reverse causation. Levine (2000) . There is a wide variation in
Private Credit in our sample, ranging from 7% in Bangladesh to 117% in Japan.
In sensitivity tests, we use several alternative indicators of financial development. To save space, we do not define the different financial development measures here. Rather, we jointly define these variables and present the sensitivity analyses below.
III. Methodology
To examine whether industries that are naturally composed of small firms grow faster than large-firm industries in countries with higher levels of financial development, this paper extends the methodology developed by RZ. In particular, we interact an industry characteristic -each industry's technological small firm share -with a country characteristic -the level of financial development. In describing the econometrics more rigorously, we only discuss the interaction between financial development and Small Firm Share. In the actual implementation, we control for the interaction of financial development with the external financial dependence of each industry as stressed by RZ.
Econometrically, we use the following regression:
where Growth i,k is the average annual growth rate of value added, in industry k and country i, over the period 1980 to 90. Country and Industry are country and industry dummies, respectively, and
Share i,k is the share of industry k in manufacturing in country i in 1980. Small Firm Share k is the benchmark share of small firms in industry k, which in our baseline specification equals the share of employment in firms with less than 20 employees in the United States in 1992. FD i is an indicator of financial development for country i, which equals Private Credit in our baseline regression. We include the interaction between the small firm share in an industry with financial development. We do not include financial development on its own, since we focus on within-country, within-industry growth rates. The dummy variables for industries and countries correct for country and industry specific characteristics that might determine industry growth patterns. We thus isolate the effect that the interaction of Small Firm Share and Private Credit has on industry growth relative to country and industry means. By including the initial share of an industry we control for a convergence effect: industries with a large share might grow more slowly, suggesting a negative sign on γ. We include the share in manufacturing rather than the level, since we focus on withincountry, within-industry growth rates. We exclude the United States (the benchmark country) from the regressions.
In interpreting the results, we focus on the interaction of financial development and small firms share, i.e., we focus on the sign and significance of δ. If δ is positive and significant, this suggests financial development exerts a disproportionately positive effect on small-firm industries relative to large-firm industries. This would suggest that financial development tends to ease growth constraints on small firms more than on large firms. A negative and significant sign would suggest that it is mostly large firms that benefit from the development of financial markets. An insignificant coefficient would suggest that financial development influences industries that are naturally composed of small firms the same as industries naturally composed of large firms. Thus, if δ enters insignificantly, this would not support the view that financial development has crossindustry distributional consequences and would not support the view that one channel through which financial development boosts aggregate economic growth is by disproportionately easing constrains on small firm growth.
Apart from using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions, we also run Instrumental
Variables (IV) regressions to address the issue of endogeneity of financial development. Based on research by La Porta et al. (1998) , Levine (1999) , Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000) , and Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2003), we use the legal origin of countries as instrumental variables for financial development. Legal systems are typically classified into four major legal families: the English common law and the French, German, and Scandinavian civil law countries, and we use dummy variables for these categories of legal origin as instruments (excluding one category, Scandinavian civil law countries, which is included in the constant term).
IV. Results and Sensitivity Tests

IV.1. Main Results
The results in Table 3 suggest that small-firm industries (industries with technologically larger shares of small firms) grow faster in economies with better-developed financial intermediaries. The interaction of Private Credit with Small Firm Share enters positively and significantly at the 5% level in column (1). We also find that the coefficient on Industry Share enters negatively and significantly. This is consistent with the convergence effect identified by RZ.
Overall, these results indicate that industries whose organization is based more on small firms than on large firms grow faster in countries with better-developed financial intermediaries.
The relationship between financial development, an industry's small firm share, and industry growth is not only statistically, but also economically large. To illustrate the effect, we compare the growth of an industry with a relatively large share of small firms and an industry with a relative low share of small firms across two countries with different levels of financial development.
Specifically, the results in column (1) Third, we consider the possibility that industries classified as small-firm industries face different growth opportunities than industries composed of larger firms, which might lead us to spuriously link industrial firm size with faster economic growth in financial developed economies. Fisman and Love (2003b) argue that financial development boosts the growth rate of industries with particularly good growth opportunities. Thus, we want to assess the independent importance of the relationship between industry growth and the interaction between financial development and Small Firm Share when controlling for cross-industry growth opportunities. Thus, in Table 4 's column 2, we follow Fisman and Love (2003b) and also include the interaction between Private Credit and their measure of industrial Sales Growth to control for growth opportunities. Sales Growth is calculated as real annual growth in net sales of U.S. firms over the period 1980 to 1989 using data from Compustat. Even when controlling for both external dependence and growth opportunities, the interaction of Small Firm Share with Private Credit enters positively and significantly.
IV.3. Sensitivity to Controlling for Different Country Characteristics
There may also exist concerns that financial development is highly correlated with other country-specific traits that interact with industry firm size and shape cross-industry growth rates.
To examine the sensitivity of the results to different country factors, we choose country traits that on theoretical grounds are associated with financial development and influence industry firm size and growth (Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990; Galor and Moav, 2005) . Specifically, we include the interaction between Small Firm Share and country characteristics besides financial development.
Thus, in Table 4 , columns 3 -5, we control for the interaction of (i) the log of GDP per capita with the Small Firm Share, (ii) average years of schooling with the Small Firm Share, and (iii) openness to trade with the Small Firm Share. Small firms might benefit from a generally more developed institutional environment. Thus, we include the overall level of economic development.
If financial development is simply proxying for the overall level of institutional development, then including the interaction between Per Capita GDP and Small Firm Share should drive out the 10 We also tried an interaction of intangibility and financial development and obtained similar results. Using the alternative definitions of a small firm does not change our main finding: Financial development fosters the growth of small-firm industries more than large-firm industries, though the significance of the interaction term between Private Credit and Small Firm Share is significant only at the ten percent level when defining a small firm as having 100 or fewer employees. We also find that once we include firms up to 500 employees in the definition of Small Firm Share, then the interaction of financial development and firm size distribution turns insignificant. Thus, these sensitivity checks (i) emphasize that financial development exerts a particularly large growth effect on small-firm industries and (ii) indicate "small-firm" industries that enjoy a disproportionately large growth effect from financial include industries with a large share of firms with less than 100 employees.
IV.4. Sensitivity to Alternative Measures of Industrial Small Firm Share
We also find that the economic size of the impact of financial development on industries with different Small Firm Shares is robust to using different definitions of small firm share.
Specifically, using the example above, moving from India (25 th percentile Private Credit) to Canada (75 th percentile Private Credit) benefits the industry at the 75 th percentile of Small Firm Share relatively more than the industry at the 25 th percentile of Small Firm Share. According to the estimated coefficients, this change induces a 1.4% growth differential between these two types of industries using 20 employees as the cut-off definition for a small firm. For example, the growth differentials are virtually identical (1.6% and 1.5 % growth differential respectively) when using 10 or 5 employees as alternative definitions of small firm in categorizing the technological level of small firm share. Given that we control for the interaction of financial development with external financial dependence, these results suggest that small-firm industries benefit more than large-firm industries from financial development.
Next, we were concerned that using indicators of Small Firm Share that are measured after the dependent variable would induce biases. While we cannot measure Small Firm Share in earlier periods due to the data constraints discussed above, we can assess whether Small Firm Share is stable and then see whether using Small Firm Share from a different year alters the results. The correlation between the small firm shares in 1992 and 1997 using the 20-employee cut-off is 90%, significant at the 1% level, and the Spearman rank correlation is 92%. This suggests that firm size distribution across industries in the United States is persistent and does not vary significantly over the business cycle (in 1992, the U.S. economy was just emerging from a recession, while 1997 was a boom year).
Moreover, this paper's findings are also robust to measuring Small Firm Share for U.S.
industries in 1997 instead of 1992. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 6 report the results when using the Small Firm Share across U.S. industries when using the 1997 Census and 10 or 20 employees as the cut-off. Using the 1997 data does not change our findings: the interaction of the Small Firm Share with Private Credit enters positively and significantly at the 1% level.
Critically, we also confirm the robustness of the results when using the United Kingdom as the benchmark economy for computing each industry's technological firm size. We use AMADEUS data for 1997 to calculate the small firm share across industries for the United Kingdom.
AMADEUS is a commercial database maintained by Bureau Van Dijk containing financial statements and employment data for over 5 million firms in Europe, including the United Kingdom.
Unfortunately, the data on industrial firm size distribution is not as complete for the United Kingdom as for the United States. 13 Nevertheless, we continue to find that small-firm industries grow faster in countries with well-developed financial systems. The interaction of Small Firm Share in the United Kingdom and Private Credit enters positively and significantly at the 5% level (Table 6 column 3), which again confirms this paper's core conclusion.
Finally, the results are robust to controlling for the average size of large firms in each industry. We were concerned that industry variation in the size of the largest firms could reflect U.S. specific factors and distort our results. Thus, we control for the median size of the large, listed firms by industry in the United States, using Compustat data to calculate the log of the median number of employees across large, listed firms in the United States. The regressions in columns (4) and (5) of Table 6 show that the interaction of Private Credit with the median firm size of large, listed firms does not enter significantly in any of the regressions at the 5% level. In contrast, we 13 Unlike for the U.S. Census, for the U.K. dataset we only have complete data for enterprises above 10 employees so that our U.K. small firm share is calculated as employment in enterprises between 10 and 20 employees relative to employment in enterprises with more than 10 employees. We only include limited liability companies in our calculations, since in the United Kingdom unlimited liability companies are not required to file financial accounts (for further details, see Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan, 2004) . Also, we exclude industries with less than 20 firm-observations. The correlation between the small firm shares for industries in the U.S. in 1992 and small firm shares in the U.K. in 1997 is 58%, significant at the 1% level and the Spearman rank correlation is 52%.
continue to find that the interaction of Private Credit and Small Firm Share enters positively and significantly at the 5% level.
IV.5. Sensitivity to Alternative Measures of Financial Development
The findings are also robust to using alternative measures of financial development as shown in Table 7 . First, we use Private Credit, averaged over the period 1980 to 1989 instead of using the value in the initial year. While using the average value may introduce a bias in our estimates, the interaction with the Small Firm Share enters positively and significantly at the 1% level, and the coefficient is only slighter higher than when using the initial value (regression 1).
Second, we use Liquid Liabilities, which equals the liquid liabilities of the financial system (currency plus demand and interest-bearing liabilities of banks and nonbank financial intermediaries) divided by GDP. Unlike Private Credit, Liquid Liabilities simply measures the size financial intermediaries and does not focus on the intermediation of credit to the private sector. As shown in Table 7 regression 2, the results hold when using Liquid Liabilities.
14 Third, we test whether small-firm industries grow faster in economies with more active stock markets. Market Turnover equals the ratio of the value of stock transactions divided by market capitalization for each country's stock exchange. While the interaction with the Small Firm Share is positive, it is not significant (Table 7 regression 3) . This suggests that, consistent with Petersen and Rajan (1995) , small firms benefit more from services provided by financial intermediaries than by stock markets.
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Fourth, we use several indicators that do not directly measure the size or efficiency of the financial system, but instead measure the institutional foundations for financial development.
Specifically, we also use Legal Efficiency, which measures the efficiency and integrity of a country's legal environment. Data are averaged over 1980-83 and are originally from Business
International Corporation. Also, we use the Law and Order index compiled by ICRG, which is based on survey data that seek to elicit the degree of trust that citizens have in the legal system's ability to resolve disputes. Finally, we use Accounting Standards, which measures the number of items listed on firms' financial statements, an indicator ranging from zero to 90 and compiled by CIFAR. Accounting Standards is a proxy for the quality of financial information about firms and has been used by RZ as a proxy for financial development. As shown in Table 7 arguments that small firms rely on financial intermediaries to obtain information on the firm through means other than publicly available financial statements (such as information deriving from long-term bank-firm relationships), so that financial intermediary development induces a particularly large, positive effect on small firms.
IV.6. Sensitivity to Alternative Sampling Period
As a robustness test, we use industry value added growth over an extended period, 1980 through 1999. The core sample includes 1242 country-industry observations for the period 1980 to 1990 (the original RZ sample). When we move to the extended period, the sample drops by one-third to only 827 country-industry observations because we lose data on several countries and industries.
Nevertheless, the results in Table 8 
V. Conclusions
This paper finds that financial development boosts the growth of industries that are naturally composed of small firms more than large-firm industries. This result is robust to controlling for other industry characteristics, many country traits, different measures of financial development, various methods for computing the technological firm size of industries, and alternative estimation samples. The results imply that one way in which financial development boosts growth is by relieving constraints on the growth of small firms.
This result has three interrelated implications. First, this paper contributes to the literature on the mechanisms through which financial development boosts aggregate economic growth.
Although a large literature shows that there is a strong positive relationship between financial development and economic growth, it is crucial to dissect the channels connecting finance and growth to (i) better understand the finance-growth nexus and (ii) assess whether finance causes growth, or whether financial development is simply a characteristic of successful economies. Past work suggests that financial development facilitates economic growth by boosting the growth of firms that rely heavily on external finance. Besides confirming this finding, we show that financial development fosters economic growth by relieving constraints on small firm growth. Thus, we identify an additional mechanism through which financial development fosters aggregate economic growth. Second, this paper's findings support the view that financial development disproportionately boosts the growth of small firms relative to large firms. Some theories of the firm argue that financial development is particularly beneficial to large firms. Others predict that financial development is especially important for lowering transaction costs and informational barriers that hinder small firm growth. Our findings support the view that under-developed financial systems are particularly detrimental to the growth of firms with less than 100 employees.
Finally, we find that financial development has cross-industry distributional consequences.
Although we do not examine specific policies, the results suggest that policies that improve the operation of the financial system will tend to boost the growth of small-firm industries more than large firm industries. Rajan and Zingales (1998) . Intangibility is a measure of the industry's dependence on intangible assets from Claessens and Laeven (2003) . Sales growth is an industry measure of sales growth from Fisman and Love (2003b) . Industry size is the logarithm of the industry's median number of employees, and is calculated using data for the year 1980 on U.S. listed firms from Compustat. UK Small firms share is the industry's share of employment by firms with less than 20 employees, and is calculated using firm-level data from Amadeus on all U.K. limited liability firms with 10 or more employees for the year 1997 (we exclude industries with less than 20 firm-observations). Table 3 Financial development, small firms share, and growth Dependent variable is average growth in real value added over the period 1980-1990 by country and ISIC industry. Share in value added is the industry's share in total value added of the country. Private Credit is claims by financial institutions on the private sector divided by GDP in 1980. Small firms share is the industry's share of employment by firms with less than 20 employees, and is calculated using data from the U.S. Census on all U.S. firms for the year 1992. External dependence is a measure of the industry's dependence on external finance, from Rajan and Zingales (1998) . The industry measures are based on U.S. data. The regression in column (3) is estimated using legal origin dummies as instrumental variable for Private Credit. All regressions include country and industry dummies, but these are not reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
(1) -5) . Per capita GDP is the logarithm of the country's real GDP per capita in 1980. Human capital is average years of schooling in population age over 25 in the year 1980. Openness is the sum of exports and imports relative to GDP in 1980. Small firms share is the industry's share of employment by firms with less than 20 employees, and is calculated using data from the U.S. Census on all U.S. firms for the year 1992. External financial dependence is a measure of the industry's dependence on external finance, from Rajan and Zingales (1998) . Intangibility is a measure of the industry's dependence on intangible assets from Claessens and Laeven (2003), and is calculated as the ratio of intangible assets to fixed assets of U.S. firms over the period 1980 to 1989 using data from Compustat. Sales growth is an industry measure of sales growth from Fisman and Love (2003b) , and is calculated as real annual growth in net sales of U.S. firms over the period 1980 to 1989 using data from Compustat. The industry measures are based on U.S. data. We include country and industry dummies, but these are not reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
(1) Table 5 Alternative measures of firm size distribution Dependent variable is average growth in real value added over the period 1980-1990 by country and ISIC industry. Share in value added is the industry's share in total value added of the country. Private Credit is claims by financial institutions on the private sector divided by GDP in 1980. Small firms share (empl<x) is the industry's share of employment by firms with less than x employees, and is calculated using data from the U.S. Census on all U.S. firms for the year 1992. External financial dependence is a measure of the industry's dependence on external finance, from Rajan and Zingales (1998) . The industry measures are based on U.S. data. We include country and industry dummies, but these are not reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
(1) Table 6 Alternative small firm data and controlling for the size of large firms Dependent variable is average growth in real value added over the period 1980-1990 by country and ISIC industry. Share in value added is the industry's share in total value added of the country. Private Credit is claims by financial institutions on the private sector divided by GDP in 1980. Small firms share (empl<x) is the industry's share of employment by firms with less than x employees, and is calculated using data from the U.S. Census on all U.S. firms for the year 1997. UK Small firms share is the industry's share of employment by firms with less than 20 employees, and is calculated using firm-level data from Amadeus on all U.K. limited liability firms with 10 or more employees for the year 1997 (we exclude industries with less than 20 firm-observations). Industry size in 1980 is the log of the median number of employees across all U.S. listed firms in Compustat. External financial dependence is a measure of the industry's dependence on external finance, from Rajan and Zingales (1998) . The industry measures are based on U.S. data. We include country and industry dummies, but these are not reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
(1) Market turnover is total value of trades to total value of shares in 1980. Accounting standards is an index of the quality of accounting standards in 1990. Legal efficiency is the measure of the country's efficiency of the legal system used by LLSV (1998), and is an average for the years 1980-1983. Law and order is an index of the law and order tradition in the country from LLSV (1998), and is an average for the years 1982-1995. Small firms share is the industry's share of employment by firms with less than 20 employees, and is calculated using data from the U.S. Census on all U.S. firms for the year 1992. External financial dependence is a measure of the industry's dependence on external finance, from Rajan and Zingales (1998) . The industry measures are based on U.S. data. We include country and industry dummies, but these are not reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
(1) Small firms share (empl<x) is the industry's share of employment by firms with less than x employees, and is calculated using data from the U.S. Census on all U.S. firms for the year 1992. External financial dependence is a measure of the industry's dependence on external finance, from Rajan and Zingales (1998) . The sample in column (3) is restricted to those observations that take non-missing values for the average growth in real value added over the period 1980-1999 variable. The industry measures are based on U.S. data. We include country and industry dummies, but these are not reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
(1) 
